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Abstract. Decentralized Online Social Networks (DOSNs) have been
proposed as an alternative solution to the current centralized Online So-
cial Networks (OSNs). Online Social Networks are based on centralized
architecture (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, or Google+), while DOSNs do not
have a service provider that acts as central authority and users have
more control over their information. Several DOSNs have been proposed
during the last years. However, the decentralization of the OSN requires
efficient solutions for protecting the privacy of users, and to evaluate the
trust between users. Blockchain represents a disruptive technology which
has been applied to several fields, among these also to Social Networks.
In this paper, we propose a manageable, user-driven and auditable ac-
cess control framework for DOSNs using blockchain technology. In the
proposed approach, the blockchain is used as a support for the definition
of privacy policies. The resource owner uses the public key of the sub-
ject to define flexible role-based access control policies, while the private
key associated with the subject’s Ethereum account is used to decrypt
the private data once access permission is validated on the blockchain.
We evaluate our solution by exploiting the Rinkeby Ethereum testnet
to deploy the smart contract, and to evaluate its performance. Experi-
mental results show the feasibility of the proposed scheme in achieving
auditable and user-driven access control via smart contract deployed on
the Blockchain.
Keywords: Blockchain, Access Control, RBAC, Social Networks.
1 Introduction
In today’s digital world, online users are generating a large amount of infor-
mation. Online users are actively engaged on various sites including Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc. In particular, a large amount of personal sen-
sitive information are generated on popular social networking sites. Privacy is
the main issue of current Social Network platforms, and several privacy disclo-
sure events have happened, such as Cambridge Analytica3. To face the privacy
3 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/17/the-cambrid ge -analytica-
scandal-changed-the-world-but-it-didnt-change-facebook
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issue, decentralization has been proposed as a possible solution. A Decentralized
Online Social Network (DOSN) is an Online Social Network (OSN) implemented
in a distributed environment. During the last years, not only several academic so-
lutions have been proposed [13,12,6], but also online services such as Mastodon4
and Diaspora5.
Thanks to the decentralization of data, users have more control over their
data. However, decentralization introduces important requirements which have
to be met, such as data availability and the information diffusion [14]. As con-
cerns privacy, access control techniques are used to manage the access to data
in several fully-decentralized DOSNs [4]. Access control policies are used to ex-
press the rights of subjects to access services, and these policies are evaluated at
access request time. For instance, in role-based access control system [17], poli-
cies are associated with resources in the network and users or groups of users
are assigned roles, which determines their applicability to access the protected
resources. A DOSN requires that access control policies should be evaluated by
users in the network to check if a user can access to a data or not [10]. Consid-
ering the dynamism of DOSNs due to the online/offline status of users [9], and
the trust problem of choosing users which are not malicious, the validation of
privacy policies is a tricky problem, which can be managed by using blockchain
technology.
Blockchain technology emerged to the world due to Bitcoin, which was the
first global cryptocurrency introduced in 2008 [1]. It is worthy to note that
the basic purpose of blockchain was to enable the functionality of a peer-to-
peer (P2P) payment system without relying on a third party. In other words,
Blockchain is a P2P network for conducting transactions in a secure and trans-
parent manner.
A blockchain is principally a list of records, called blocks. Each block con-
tains the hash of the previous block, and other essential information such as
timestamp, and a set of transactions etc. Note that the first block of the chain
is called a genesis block, which provides a foundation to create other blocks on
top of it.
Ethereum has received significant attention from industry and academia in
recent years thank to the introduction of the smart contracts. Because of their
resilience to tampering, smart contracts are used in many scenarios such as
transfer of money, games etc. [2]. Ethereum supports two types of accounts. Ex-
ternally Owned Accounts (EOAs) are used to transfer money from one account
holder to another one. Furthermore, each EOA is assigned a unique 20 bytes
address, which uniquely identifies the account holder in the network. Ethereum
also supports contract accounts simply called contracts. Each contract account
is associated with a unique code to uniquely identify it in the network. Ethereum
accounts are associated with unique public/private key pairs. Transactions can
be sent to specific addresses represented by public keys, and only users with the
specified destination addresses can access them in the network. The execution
4 https://mastodon.social/about
5 https://diasporafoundation.org/
of transactions in the Ethereum network requires the payment of Ether. Thus,
users possessing sufficient Ether can only execute the code of the smart contracts
stored on the blockchain. Therefore, Ethereum users are required to purchase
gas by paying Ether. The consensus technique used by Ethereum is called Proof-
of-Work, which enables miners to solve a cryptographic challenge (i.e., to guess
random numbers).
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based access control for DOSNs. The
role-based access control policies are stored on the blockchian, are publicly au-
ditable and permit the verification of the user’s rights even when the owner of the
data is not logged in the social network. Our decentralized access control man-
agement system relies on the DOSN users to grant, revoke or update the access
rights by making transactions to execute the respective functions of smart con-
tract. DOSN users are associated with Ethereum accounts in order to uniquely
identify themselves in the network. We focus on the Role-based Access Control
Model (RBAC) [17] because roles play a vital role in managing the contents of
DOSNs. Thus, a DOSN user can send transactions to the access control con-
tract deployed on the blockchain to assign roles to his/her colleagues, to family’s
and friends’ members etc., and to allow only the intended users to access the
resources of the resource owner.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to
the presentation of the background on DOSNs and of the Related Works. In
section 3, we discuss the proposed framework. Section 4 presents the results of
the performance evaluation. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
Decentralized Online Social Networks (DOSNs) are introduced to overcome pri-
vacy issues of current OSNs. DOSNs offer a new revolution for data management,
thereby allowing the users to control and manage their own personal informa-
tion. In other words, DOSNs function as a dynamic peer-to-peer (P2P) network
to store the users’ profiles without reliance on a single service provider. However,
DOSNs introduce many new problems regarding the availability, access control
and availability of the shared items [8]. Various architectures for decentralized
Online Social Networks have been proposed [13,12,6,5]. Usually encryption oper-
ations are used on the stored data such that only clients with the corresponding
decryption keys are allowed to decrypt and view the stored contents. Access con-
trol is one of the main used technique to manage the access to data in DOSN.
Indeed, DOSNs use privacy policies with encryption techniques, in many cases
they use the Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) [10].
In detail, LifeSocial.KOM [12], and PeerSoN [5]) are based on encryption.
In particular, they combine different encryption schemes in order to protect
the privacy of users’ contents. Each content generated by a user should be en-
crypted and replicated on different users’ devices. DOSNs, such as My3 [16] and
DiDuSoNet [13], do not rely on encryption techniques, indeed contents remains
unencrypted on the devices, and trust is exploited to store data. The privacy
solutions adopted by DOSNs must allow user to deny access to unauthorized con-
tacts or to grant access to new contacts, regardless of whether their are based
on encryption or not.
One of the main problem in DOSNs is that data are stored on users devices, so
they are available as long as users are online. To enhance data availability, users’
data are replicated on the devices of different users. It is also worth noticing that
the evaluation of privacy policies regarding the data of a user can be evaluated
by the user itself if she/he is online, otherwise it must be executed by some
trusted node hosting the data replica.
Blockchain technology is a disruptive solution which can be exploited by
DOSNs in order to improve privacy systems. During the last years, blockchain
has been applied to several scenarios and also to Social Networks. Several social
Network platforms [18,15,3] exploiting blockchain have been proposed mainly
in order to overcome the privacy problems of current OSNs. In many cases the
blockchain is exploited to support techniques for the detection of fake news.
However, to the best of our knowledge, all current Blockchain-based Social
Networks do not exploit blockchain as a support to control accesses to the data
owned by the users.
3 The Proposed Framework
The basic objective of our proposal is to use the blockchain to store and evaluate
role-based access control policies. To achieve this objective, the resource owner
can send transactions to the role-based access control smart contract deployed on
the Ethereum blockchain in order to assign/evaluate roles to other DOSN users
in the network. The access control policies are stored on the blockchain, thereby
allowing the resource owner as well as other nodes to check the enforcement of
the privacy policies when the contract receives access requests. Our framework is
privacy preserving because the real identifies of DOSN users are not disclosed to
other users in the network. The main rationale behind our approach is motivated
from the fact that Ethereum uses a single public address for each account holder.
We need to make the following essential configurations to apply the Ethereum
platform in our access control system.
– Each DOSN user must be associated with an Ethereum account to uniquely
identity itself in the network. Thus, this account allows each peer to claim
the deployment of a smart contract, and to assign roles to other DOSN users
– All DOSN users can configure and run the Ethereum client because such
devices have sufficient computing capabilities. A DOSN user can use its
Ethereum client to directly interact with the blockchain. Indeed, they can
also send transactions to execute the main functions of smart contracts.
In our framework, a DOSN user can easily check the blockchain at any time
to determine whether he/she is assigned a role from another DOSN user. Fur-
thermore, this approach is intended to achieve distributed auditability, thereby
preventing third parties from fraudulently denying the access rights granted by
role-based access control policies. It is worthy to note that a subject who wishes
to access the resources of the resource owner must assert that it possesses a role
that was issued by the resource owner. The architecture of our access control
framework is depicted in Figure 1. The main actors of our framework include the
resource owner, a node trusted from the resource owner and subjects (i.e., users
who are interested in viewing the resources of the resource owner). The resource
owner uses the Ethereum address of the subject in order to define role-based
privacy policies using smart contract.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the proposed framework for DOSNs using Smart Contract
In our approach, the resource owner has a set of trusted nodes where data
are stored, as described in [10], in order to guarantee the data availability even
when the user is offline. The choice of trusted replica nodes is outside the scope
of this article. A generic request is sent to the resource owner when it is online,
otherwise it is sent to one trusted node chosen at random. These nodes check
the privacy policies to determine the permission associated with roles. Based on
the evaluation of access control policies, the subject is either allowed or denied
to view or download the private data of the resource owner.
When a new relationship is established between the resource owner and the
subject, the later involved in the relationship has to share its public key (i.e.,
Ethereum address). After verification of the user’s identity, the resource owner
sends a transaction to the access control contract in order to issue a desired
role such as colleague, friend, friend-of-friend or family etc. Finally, after the
establishment of a relationship and privacy policy definition using blockchain,
the subject can send access requests to the resource owner or to trusted nodes
when the former is offline. Finally, after confirming information in the blockchain,
the resource owner or trusted node is assured that the asserted role is assigned
by the resource owner.
3.1 Main Functions of the Framework
The resource owner can send transactions to invoke the main functions of the
RBAC deployed on the blockchain. An overview of the main functions of the
proposed framework is given below;
– Policy Creation: This function allows the resource owner to issue role to
a requesting DOSN user in the network. It requires the Ethereum address
of the subject, and the role that the resource owner wishes to assign. As a
simple example, if Bob (i.e., the resource owner) wishes to add Alice (i.e.,
subject) as friend, he simply needs to provide the Ethereum address of Alice,
and the role friend and an access permission. To accomplish this goal, the
resource owner simply needs to make a new policy creation transaction to
execute the policyAdd() function of the RBAC smart contract deployed on
the blockchain.
– Policy Update: In the proposed framework, the resource owner can update
a policy at anytime. The resource owner needs to specify the new role, per-
mission and address of the subject for which the privacy policy needs to be
updated. To accomplish this goal, the resource owner simply needs to make
a policy update transaction to execute the policyUpdate() function of the
RBAC smart contract. This function requires address of the subject, role
and permission as parameters to assign a new role or change the associated
access permission.
– Policy Deletion: The resource owner can also revoke an existing privacy
policy by making a policy revocation transaction to execute the policy-
Delete() function of the RBAC smart contract.
– Right Transfer: The resource owner must not only be able to specify who
can access the resource, he must also be able to add users who can further
delegate that authorization to other users. To accomplish this goal, only
users endorsed by the resource owner can send transactions to execute the
roleTransfer() function of the smart contract. This function requires the link
or identification information of the policy and the address of the new user
to transfer the access rights. The framework is scalable because the current
right holders can further transfer the access rights to new users as well.
– Access Control: This function allows the resource owner or trusted nodes
to check access permission on the blockchain when an access request is sub-
mitted by the subject. To accomplish this goal, the resource owner or trusted
nodes perform an access control transaction to execute the AccessControl()
function of the smart contract.
– Contract Deletion: The resource owner can also disable the RBAC smart
contract by making a contract deactivation transaction to execute the
deleteRBAC() function of the RBAC smart contract.
We use two-dimensional mappings from the elements of address (primary key)
and role (secondary key) to create, update, revoke and validate these policies in
the blockchain.
3.2 Challenge-Response Authentication
The challenge-response protocol is executed when a subject sends an access
request to the resource owner or to a trusted node when the former is offline.
The basic steps of this protocol are discussed as follows;
– Declaration: The aim of this step is to enable the subject to declare that
it possesses a unique Ethereum account/address that was used to issue a
role, and permission by the resource owner. In our simple example, Alice
will assert the role friend to indicate that this role has been issued by Bob
in order to access his resources. Thus, the asserted role makes Alice eligible
to access the protected resources of Bob.
– Information Verification: Given the assertion of the subject, the resource
owner or trusted node checks the RBAC policies published on the blockchain
to determine weather the corresponding public key was issued a role by the
resource owner. Given the data on the blockchain, these nodes will be able
to check the information related to the public key of the subject. Finally,
the node receiving the request challenges the requesting DOSN user in order
to verify his/her real identity (i.e., to determine whether he/she is the true
owner of the Ethereum account).
– Challenge: The resource owner or trusted node selects a random data d,
and asks the subject to sign it.
– Response: Response from the subject determines the true owner of the
corresponding Ethereum account because the private key is required to sign
the message. Therefore, the creation of a correct signature is only possible
if the user possesses the corresponding private key. Thus, the message can
only be signed by the legitimate owner. To accomplish this goal, we use the
following function:
S = Sign(pk; address; d) (1)
where pk represents the private key of the subject, and d represents the
random data sent to sign. Thus, a correct signature is only possible if the
subject possesses the corresponding private key which is uniquely defined
for each Ethereum account, and it is also unique for each DOSN user. The
subject then sends S back to the resource owner or trusted node.
– Response Confirmation: The resource owner or trusted nodes will allow
the subject to access the protected resources if and only if a correct signature
is generated by the subject. To accomplish this goal, the resource owner or
trusted node uses the following verification function:
confirmResponse(address; d;S). (2)
Finally, the resource owner or trusted node will allow access to the resource
if and only if the verification process is successful. Please note that the authenti-
cation protocol can be executed offline, and the Solidity sha3 [7] function can be
used to securely generate the signature. This technique can be used to generate
a message signature without disclosing the private key.
4 Performance Evaluation
Every transaction that is used to invoke the function of a smart contract requires
the payment of a fee in order to compensate the mining node for the execution
of transaction and saving it on the blockchain. Ethereum uses gas to express this
fee. Users can purchase gas from the mining nodes by paying Ether. Please note
that Gas and Ether are two distinct terms because gas indicates a constant cost
of performing an operation on a Blockchain network, whereas Ether is a volatile
virtual currency, which is used to pay for the network resources.
4.1 Experiment Setting
We use the solidity [19] programming language to develop a prototype of the
proposed RBAC smart contract, and deployed it on the Rinkeby Ethereum test-
net. During analysis in the month of April, we observed an average gas value of
≈ 0.000000021 ETH, and 1 Ether ≈ 137.66 USD. Experimental results show that
our proposed smart contract requires 1869303 gas for deployment. Therefore, the
creation and deployment of our proposed smart contract on the blockchain re-
quires 0.256 USD. However, it is only a single time cost to initialize our proposed
RBAC smart contract.
4.2 Results
Table 1 shows the one-time costs of the functions of the proposed smart contract
when a subject is assigned a role by the resource owner. It is worthy to note
that that a role is assigned to the user together with an additional permission
element. As it can be observed from the table, the gas consumption costs are
slightly increased. However, the costs of the remaining three functions are always
constant because these functions are independent of the main functions of the
smart contract (i.e., policy creation and policy updation).
Table 1 also shows that the one-time constant cost of the access control
function is 0.0031 USD$. The resource owner can also delete the smart contract
from the blockchain by invoking the deleteRBAC() function, which performs
the suicide or self-destruct operation to remove the code of RBAC from the
Ethereum blockchain [11].
We performed an experiment to evaluate the effects of the number of subjects
in the RBAC policy on Gas consumption (i.e., when the resource owner assigns
role to a group of subjects in a single policy creation transaction). The results
of the experiment are presented in Figure 2(a). Results show that the policy
Table 1. Costs of the different functions of the RBAC smart contract
RBAC Function Gas Used Cost(ether) USD($)
policyAdd() 27864 0.000028 0.0038
policyUpdate() 27800 0.000028 0.0038
policyDelete() 22680 0.000023 0.0031
roleTransfer() 51456 0.000051 0.0069
AccessControl() 22808 0.000023 0.0031
deleteRBAC() 13455 0.000027 0.0036
creation and update transaction for 1 Ethereum address require 3,392 gas con-
sumption on the Rinkeby testnet and this cost increases linearly as we increase
the number of addresses on these two transactions. We also observed that the
contract deployment gas cost also increases linearly as the number of users in
the RBAC policy are increased. It is worthy to note that the given results show
the applicability of the proposed framework to simultaneously assign the same
role to multiple users in a single policy creation transaction.
We performed another experiment to evaluate the effects of the number of
bits on gas consumption as shown in Figure 2(b). Results of the experiment
show that each single bit denoting a particular input in the policy creation and
updation transactions requires constant amount of gas on the Rinkeby testnet.
(a) Number of users vs Gas cost (b) Number of bits vs Gas cost
Fig. 2. Effects of number of users (a) and bits (b) on gas consumption
The privacy policies can be valid if miners have approved all the related trans-
actions to the smart contract deployed on the blockchain, and these transactions
are recorded to new blocks. It is worthy to note that the block generation time
is directly proportional to the transaction rate (i.e., the more transactions are
made, the more time it will take to generate the relevant block). We setup our
own private Ethereum network to assess the effects of the number of miners on
block generation time. Initially, we configure one miner to mine block. However,
as we increased the number of miners, the block generation time decreased and
became stable when the number of miners reached to 4 as shown in Figure 3.
Furthermore, we also confirmed the block generation time on Rinkeby testnet.
Fig. 3. Block Generation Time vs. Number of Miners
4.3 Security Analysis
It is not possible for an adversary to issue role-based policies on behalf of the
resource owner because execution of the contract functions is only allowed to the
owner of the RBAC smart contract. Furthermore, acting as a subject, the goal
of the attacker is to impersonate a role that it does not possess (i.e., it can try to
assert false roles to the resource provider or trusted nodes) in order to gain illegal
access to the resources of another DOSN user. However, as already discussed,
each DOSN user has unique private key in the network, and an adversary is
unable to compromise the private keys of the users in the system.
Each user in the DOSN network can chose one or more of its neighbors as
trusted nodes. These nodes are selected to perform trusted actions in the network
including data storage and access control.
We assume that the cryptographic primitives used in the framework can
not be broken by the adversary. Therefore, they are unable to forge the digital
signature and to obtain hash collisions. It is worthy to note that the proposed
framework is blockchain-oriented, thus, we assume that an adversary can not
control a majority of the computing power in the network in order to avoid the
51% attack.
The challenge-response protocol is used to perform a secure verification of
the user’s identity, role and the associated access permission on the blockchain.
The verification steps used in the challenge response protocol can be conducted
offline, and latest technologies used in devices such as Near Field Communication
(NFC) and Quick Response (QR) codes [20] can be used to effectively transfer
the message and signature.
Fig. 4. The output of policy creation transaction using Remix IDE [19]
Fig. 5. The output of privacy policy validation transaction
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this research, we proposed an auditable and user-driven role-based access con-
trol management framework (RBAC) for DOSNs using blockchain technology.
DOSN users are associated with Ethereum accounts having unique public, pri-
vate keys. The public keys serve as addresses of the users while the private keys
are used to prove the real identities of DOSN users. Each DOSN user is capable
to invoke the assign and revoke functions of the access control contract deployed
on the blockchain. Advantages of the proposed scheme include auditability (i.e.,
the user-role assignment is visible on the blockchain). Thus, any user can easily
inspect them at any time. Furthermore, they can include other elements such as
expiry time to automatically revoke the role assigned to users. We are planning
to extend our work in several directions. We will investigate the possibility of
exploiting external storages, such as private clouds, to guarantee data availabil-
ity for offline users. Furthermore, we are developing a DAPP to interact with a
system of different smart contracts on the blockchain including a tool to trans-
late role based access control policies to smart contracts to be deployed on the
blockchain.
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